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This chapter argues that consent is not an appropriate or effective way to distinguish legitimate 
sexual activity from sexual violation. Consent is enmeshed with a particular notion of the 
Kantian liberal subject and as such is inapt to respond to the bodily, affective and relational 
aspects of subjectivity in general and sexual subjectivity specifically. To champion consent as 
the standard for legitimate sexual activity implies that sexual relations are inherently 
asymmetric, obscures the context within which agreements to engage in sexual activity are 
made, and overlooks the fluid and variable nature of sexual activity itself that renders it ill-
suited to a consent framework. 
 
The Chapter considers alternative models of sex and sexual violation based on notions of 
communication and negotiation. Drawing on these models alongside theoretical argument and 
original empirical data, a new framework of ‘freedom to negotiate’ is proposed. The standard 
of ‘freedom to negotiate’ does not prescribe the form or content that any negotiation must take. 
It emphasizes instead the context in which sexual activity takes place, requiring that, at a 
minimum, all parties to sexual activity should have the space to negotiate both the fact and 




Consent has become the dominant paradigm in legal and lay discourses for distinguishing sex 
from sexual violation. However, consent based models of sexual offending are flawed in a 
number of respects. The first two parts of this chapter explore respectively the reasons why 
consent has been embraced as a framework for evaluating sexual encounters and the problems 
with this framework, concluding that consent is not an appropriate standard by which to 
distinguish sex from sexual violation. The third part of the chapter introduces negotiation as a 
potential alternative framework, focusing on two specific law reform proposals put forward by 
Lois Pineau and Michelle Anderson. This work offers valuable insights for rethinking the 
sexual offences so as to better reflect the reality of sexual encounters, but also reproduces some 
of the problematic aspects of consent frameworks. The final part of the chapter draws on these 
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models alongside original empirical data to develop a concept of ‘freedom to negotiate’. This 
is proposed as a viable basis around which to reframe sexual offences law. 
 
Consent as the dominant paradigm in sexual offences law  
Consent is the primary dividing line between sex and sexual violation in English and Welsh 
law. It was recognised as a crucial element of the crime of rape as far back as the mid nineteenth 
century,1 and has become increasingly central to sex offences law, having been included within 
the first statutory definition of rape in 19762 and enshrined as the pivotal element of rape and 
sexual assault in the Sexual Offences Act 2003.3 More recently, the European Court of Human 
Rights has affirmed that all non-consensual sex, not just that involving physical violence, is 
rape.4 Numerous legal scholars have endorsed the definition of rape and sexual assault as non-
consensual sexual activity and have explored in detail the specific form consent has taken and 
should take in sexual offences law.5 
 
The legal reforms which have placed consent at the centre of sexual offences law have 
been widely embraced in large part because they emerged as a progressive shift from previous 
constructions of rape and sexual assault. Earlier definitions of rape emphasized physical force 
on the part of the perpetrator and resistance on the part of the victim, neither of which are 
required under a consent-based definition.6 The latter therefore protects a greater number of 
people from having sexual activity imposed upon them against their will and has thus been 
broadly — though not universally — welcomed by feminist and women’s movements.7 At the 
same time, situating consent as the marker of legitimate sexual activity provides a basis for 
resisting the criminalization of sexual acts that fall foul of conservative Christian sexual 
morality, eg anal sex and/or sexual activity between two or more men. Hence consent has also 
been championed by the gay rights movement and other sexual minorities. 
 
Despite academic and popular support for the consent paradigm, sexual offending 
remains a highly problematic area of criminal law and criminal justice. Rates of victimization 
                                                          
1 R v Camplin (1845) 1 Cox 220. See also Bradley (1910) 4 Cr App R 225, in which it was held that the burden lies with the 
prosecution to prove that the victim did not consent. 
2 Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976 s 1(1). 
3 Sexual Offences Act 2003 ss1-4. 
4 MC v Bulgaria (2005) 40 EHRR 20; Joanne Conaghan, ‘Extending the Reach of Human Rights to Encompass Victims of 
Rape: M.C. v Bulgaria’ (2005) 13 Feminist Legal Studies 145. 
5 See for example, Douglas Husak and George Thomas, ‘Date Rape, Social Convention and Reasonable Mistakes’ (1992) 11 
Law and Philosophy 95; Jennifer Temkin and Andrew Ashworth, ‘The Sexual Offences Act 2003: Rape, Sexual Assault and 
the Problems of Consent’ (2004) Criminal Law Review 328; Sharon Cowan, ‘Choosing Freely: Theoretically Reframing the 
Concept of Consent’ in Rosemary Hunter and Sharon Cowan (eds), Choice and Consent: Feminist Engagements with Law 
and Subjectivity (Routledge 2007); Catherine Elliott and Claire de Than, ‘The Case for a Rational reconstruction of Consent 
in Criminal Law’ (2007) 70 The Modern Law Review 225; Vanessa Munro, ‘Constructing Consent: Legislating Freedom 
and Legitimating Constraint in the Expression of Sexual Autonomy’ (2008) 41 Akron Law Review 923; Michelle Dempsey, 
‘Victimless Consent and the Volenti Maxim: How Consent Works’ (2013) 7 Criminal Law and Philosophy 11. 
6 Vanessa Munro, ‘From Consent to Coercion: Evaluating International and Domestic Frameworks for the Criminalization of 





are consistently high, whilst reporting and conviction rates are low.8 In addition, reforms to the 
substantive law have not prevented factors other than consent – such as the infliction of 
physical injuries, the status of the relationship between the complainant and the accused, and 
the behaviour of the complainant after an alleged rape – from influencing the judgements of 
actors at every stage of the criminal process. 9  These difficulties are often interpreted as 
resulting from the relevant actors failing to properly apply consent to the facts; the status of 
consent itself as the dividing line between sex and sexual violation frequently goes 
unchallenged.10 This perception that consent is not being properly understood underpinned the 
introduction of a statutory definition of consent in the Sexual Offences Act 2003,11 as well as 
calls for consent to be included in sex education programmes at both school and university 
level.12 It is, however, far from clear that all those advocating a consent-based definition of sex 
and sexual violation are using the term ‘consent’ in the same way. 
 
Consent is an ambiguous concept.  There is a lack of consensus as to whether consent 
consists of a mental state or some external performance; 13  and even within these broad 
categories consent could consist of a range of mental states including actual desire, 
ambivalence, acquiescence and submission, or be constituted by a variety of actions including 
physical initiation, verbal agreement, or by a lack of action ie a failure to say ‘no’ or resist. In 
addition, the extent to which different forms of coercion, deception and lack of mental 
competence can invalidate consent are hotly contested.14 I do not, however, propose to develop 
a clearer definition of consent. By contrast, I submit that consent is not an appropriate standard 
by which to distinguish sex from sexual violation. 
 
Consent is inadequate to distinguish sex from sexual violation 
Consent is not an appropriate or effective way to distinguish legitimate sexual activity from 
sexual violation, for four key reasons. First, consent is enmeshed with a particularly 
individualistic notion of the Kantian liberal subject and as such is inapt to respond to the bodily, 
affective and relational dimensions of sexual encounters. Second, consent models support a 
construction of sexual encounters as inherently asymmetric and unequal. Third, the variable 
and amorphous nature of sexual activity is poorly-suited to a consent framework. Fourth, 
consent obscures much of the relevant context within which agreements to engage in sexual 
activity are made. 
                                                          
8 Ministry of Justice, Home Office and Office for National Statistics ‘An Overview of Sexual Offending in England and 
Wales’ (2013). 
9 Liz Kelly, Jo Lovett and Linda Regan, ‘A Gap or a Chasm? Attrition in reported Rape Cases’ (Home Office Research 
Study 293, Home Office Research, Development and Statistics Directorate, 2005). 
10 But see for example Catharine MacKinnon, Towards a Feminist Theory of the State (Harvard University Press 1989) and 
Victor Tadros, ‘Rape Without Consent’ (2006) 26 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 515 for problematisation of the concept 
of consent itself.  
11 Sexual Offences Act 2003 s74. 
12 See for example Sally Weale, ‘Sex Education Should be Mandatory in All Schools, MPs Demand’ The Guardian (London 
17 February 2015) < http://www.theguardian.com/education/2015/feb/17/sex-education-mandatory-all-schools-mps-
demand> accessed 6 October 2015; University of Sussex Students’ Union, ‘I Heart Consent Campaign’ University of Sussex 
Students’ Union http://www.sussexstudent.com/campaigns/i-heart-consent/ accessed 6 October 2015. 
13 For an overview of this debate see Cowan (n 5). 




Consent represents a liberal understanding of subjecthood 
The consenting subject is arguably the epitome of the rational liberal subject.15 Consent is 
effectively the granting of certain rights over oneself to another; it plays a central role in liberal 
discourses of the self as a mechanism by which autonomy is exercised. In the specific context 
of sexual offences, it functions as the gatekeeper of bodily autonomy, a power to control or 
limit access to one’s body. This framework invokes a Cartesian dualism in which the mind is 
viewed as the locus of the self, while the body is merely property owned by the self or the 
vessel in which the self is housed.16 Autonomy is then constructed as a cognitive process of 
reflection and rational choice. As such it obscures the central role that sensation, emotion, 
bodily realities and relationships with others play in guiding human decision-making, 
particularly in the area of sexuality.17 This has several negative results. 
 
First, the abstract disembodied form of autonomy with which consent is associated 
leads to a misunderstanding of the wrong of sexual violation. When framed as non-consensual 
sex, the wrong of rape tends to be understood as a violation of the will, in contradistinction to 
the body. The removal of choice is certainly one of the wrongs of rape, but it does not fully 
capture the wrong of this and related offences. Rape is an experience in which bodily contact 
and physical sensation in combination with the cultural and personal meanings of that contact 
creates a profound and unique sense of violation. Sexual offence laws that promote a 
disembodied conception of autonomy are therefore seriously misguided in that by 
characterising rape and sexual assault as wrongs against the mind, they obscure both the wrong 
against the body and the extent to which mind and body converge.18 This misunderstanding of 
the wrong of rape can also lead to an underestimation of the harms of rape, particularly in cases 
where physical violence and injury are relatively minimal.19 
 
Second, as a threshold requirement for intimate physical contact, consent emphasizes 
the policing of bodily boundaries. As such, consent models are associated with a competitive 
conception of autonomy as isolation or exclusion, through which individuals are encouraged 
to jealously guard their own interests against those of others rather than taking an interest in 
each other’s desires.20 Within this framework potential sexual partners are logically understood 
as threats (who may violate one’s bodily boundaries if one’s nonconsent is not enforced), or 
obstacles (whose consent must be obtained in order to proceed with one’s own desires) rather 
than collaborators in the creation of a mutually satisfying experience. 
 
                                                          
15 Munro, ‘Constructing Consent’ (n 5). 
16 Nicola Lacey, ‘Unspeakable Subjects: Impossible Rights: Sexuality, Integrity and Criminal Law’ (1998) 11 Canadian 
Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 47; Cowan (n 5). 
17 See Tanya Palmer, Renegotiating Sex and Sexual Violation in the Criminal Law (Hart, forthcoming) for a fuller 
discussion. 
18 Cowan (n 5); see also Ann Cahill, Rethinking Rape (Cornell University Press 2001) 197. 
19 See for example Donald Dripps, ‘Beyond Rape: An Essay on the Difference Between the Presence of Force and the 
Absence of Consent’ (1992) 92 Columbia Law Review 1780. 
20 Jennifer Nedelsky, ‘Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities’ (1989) 1 Yale Journal of Law and 
Feminism 7, 12. 
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Third, the twin emphasis in the liberal autonomy-consent framework on rationality and 
boundedness (both psychic and physical) sets a threshold for subjecthood which facilitates the 
exclusion of some categories of people from its remit. Those who supposedly lack stable 
physical boundaries – eg gay men, all women, and persons with disabilities21 - cannot have 
their boundaries protected, while those deemed to lack a rational will – eg children and 
individuals with learning difficulties – cannot have their will respected. The sex life of these 
individuals cannot be easily accommodated within a consent framework and can thus be subject 
to a separate ethical and legal regime with a different set of rules. An illustration of this can be 
seen in the proliferation of specific offences against mentally disordered victims under the 
Sexual Offences Act 2003.22 The ostensible neutrality of consent, and liberal subjectivity in 
general, thus masks its uneven operation in practice. 
 
Consent implies an asymmetric interaction 
Consent is inherently asymmetric.23 Framing an interaction as consensual suggests that one 
party makes a suggestion or request, to which another party can either consent or object.24 
Consent is therefore a minimal, reactive form of participation. In the specific context of sexual 
activity, a consent framework implies that sex always involves one (active) person doing 
something to another (passive) person.25 Thus two parties to an encounter are not equally 
situated. A party who does not want to engage in sex is always at a disadvantage because the 
consequences of not persuading the other to respect one’s interests are far more serious.26 
Moreover, the differentiated positions of ‘initiator’ and ‘responder’ which a consent framework 
implies are not equally available to all. The distribution of these roles is shaped by strong 
cultural associations between masculinity, penetration, and sexual assertiveness, even 
aggression, and between femininity, passivity, and openness or violability.27 
 
The uneven burden on the parties is compounded in the context of a criminal 
investigation and trial. Assuming it is proven that relevant sexual activity between the parties 
took place, a conviction for rape or sexual assault hinges on two key questions: Did the 
complainant consent? Did the defendant reasonably believe the complainant was consenting? 
Both invite an inquiry into the complainant’s bodily comportment: did they say or do anything 
which could be reasonably interpreted as consent? Thus it is the complainant, rather than the 
defendant, whose actions are investigated. This tendency to ‘put the victim on trial’28 can be 
extremely traumatising, and has been likened to a ‘second rape’.29  
 
                                                          
21 Lacey (n 16), 115. 
22 Sexual Offences Act 2003, ss30-44; for discussion of these offences and their relationship to consent see Tanya Palmer, 
‘State Control of Consensual Sexual Behaviour Through the Sexual Offences Act 2003’in Alan Reed, Chris Ashford and 
Nicola Wake (eds) Consent and Control: Legal Perspectives on State Power (Cambridge Scholars Publishing, forthcoming). 
23 MacKinnon (n 10); Victor Tadros ‘No Consent: A Historical Critique of the Actus Reus of Rape’ (1999) 3 Edinburgh Law 
Review 317. 
24 Robert Veatch, ‘Abandoning Informed Consent’ (1995) 25 Hastings Center Report 5, 5. 
25 Ngaire Naffine, ‘Possession: Erotic Love in the Law of Rape’ (1994) 57 The Modern Law Review 10. 
26 MacKinnon (n 10), 174. 
27 Nicola Gavey, Just Sex? The Cultural Scaffolding of Rape (Routledge 2005). 
28 Tadros (n 10), 517. 
29 Lee Madigan and Nancy Gamble, The Second Rape: Society’s Continued Betrayal of the Victim (Lexington Books 1991). 
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Distinguishing sex and sexual violation on the basis of consent envisages a question 
and answer model, whereby one person sets the terms of the interaction and the other can only 
accept or reject them; it ‘does not envision a situation the woman controls being placed in, or 
choices she frames.’30 The restrictiveness of this way of thinking is illustrated by the well-used 
feminist slogan ‘no means no’, and the more recent variant, ‘yes means yes’. Both phrases 
emphasise a woman’s right have her sexual choices respected and challenge a host of lingering 
myths about female sexuality in a snappy and memorable form. Nevertheless, in centering the 
right to give or withhold consent, these slogans still position women as answering a question; 
they do not consider a woman doing the asking. Nor do they make room for the more radical 
possibility of reciprocity or co-production of sexual experience. As such, they demonstrate the 
limits of the binary structure of sexual participation presupposed by the consent model. In 
reality, sexual encounters often develop organically and mutually, without the parties taking 
on fixed active or passive roles.31 Thus, while consent is clearly absent from the worst sexual 
encounters it will also be absent in the most positive sexual encounters jointly instigated by 
mutually active partners, because both partners are in a state beyond consent, a state of active 
involvement and participation rather than reaction or submission.32 
 
Consent presupposes an act with clear, fixed parameters 
Consent works well for activities that are very specific in form, and/or where any variability is 
controlled by one party. So, for example, I can consent to a standing order arrangement 
whereby my bank transfers a fixed amount of money from my account to my landlord each 
month to cover my rent. The parameters of this arrangement are established in advance and, 
provided I am informed of and capable of understanding the terms, it makes sense to say that I 
consent to them. If I want the arrangement to stop, I can withdraw my consent. Consider 
another scenario in which I lend my car to a friend. Here again, there will be some pre-defined 
parameters. Some of these will be explicitly agreed, such as the dates and times during which 
she will borrow the car. Others may be implicit, for example it will likely go without saying 
that I do not consent to the vehicle being used for criminal activity. There will nevertheless be 
some uncertainty in this scenario. I may not know which specific roads my friend will drive on 
or the exact distance she will cover. To the extent of this uncertainty I am putting myself — or 
rather my car — in her hands. By consenting I grant her permission to make choices within the 
agreed parameters. Does consent to sex operate in the same way? 
 
One view of sex, which David Archard has termed the ‘climactic model’,33 holds that 
‘full sex’ consists of penetrative intercourse and (penile) ejaculation, and relegates any other 
sexual activity to the category of foreplay. On this account, consent to sex operates much like 
consent to a friend borrowing my car. The key parameters have been specified in advance, and 
by giving consent one party hands control to the other to do whatever they choose within those 
parameters. In the car-borrowing scenario the finer details of where, how far and how fast my 
friend drives the car are all part of one overarching act of borrowing the car, which has been 
                                                          
30 MacKinnon (n 10), 174; for a similar argument see Wendy Brown, States of Injury (Princeton University Press 1995). 
31 Cowan (n 5). 
32 David Archard, Sexual Consent (Westview Press 1998). 
33 For a critique of the climactic model see Archard (ibid.), 22-24. 
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consented to. If sexual consent operates in the same way, any other sexual touching occurring 
around the same time as the penetration is counted as part and parcel of one seamless act of 
sexual intercourse. Archard rightly condemns this model, on the basis that it falsely implies 
that non-penetrative sexual activity cannot be enjoyed for its own sake and because it underpins 
the claim that consent to any form of sexual intimacy is consent to penetrative intercourse.34  
 
Seemingly at the other end of the scale are models such as the Antioch Sexual Offense 
Policy of the 1990s, which required explicit verbal consent to every ‘level’ of sexual activity.35 
Under this policy, sexual consent operates more like my banking example. Consent is granted 
explicitly and for a very specific action, which must cease if consent is revoked. The policy 
was widely mocked and dismissed as unromantic, unrealistic, and requiring far too much of 
participants in sexual activity. 36  However, critiques of the policy tend to focus on the 
requirement of verbal consent, and in doing so mask a deeper flaw. The policy shares the same 
fundamental problem as the climactic model: it imagines that sex can be broken down into 
discrete acts. The Antioch policy divides sexual activity into much smaller units, but the 
underlying approach is the same. Both frameworks construct sex as constituted by individual 
acts which are fairly definite in form and uniform in character, such that autonomous 
participation in those acts can be exhausted by the giving or withholding of consent. 
 
In reality, sexual activity is nebulous, variable and mutually produced. As a result, it is 
ill-suited to a consent framework. Breaking sex down into distinct acts, as per Antioch, does 
little to address the fact that parties to a sexual encounter need to be able to express something 
more than mere willingness (or lack of willingness) to participate. They also need to be able to 
negotiate the quality of that encounter, to express concepts such as ‘faster’, ‘harder’, ‘that 
hurts’, ‘touch me here’. This kind of communication appears peripheral under a consent 
framework, yet it is central to real world sexual communication.37 
 
A consent framework decontextualizes sexual encounters 
A focus on consent can obscure relevant circumstances within which the sexual activity takes 
place and the reasons why an individual has ostensibly ‘consented’.38 Although a considerable 
body of literature has explored the way conditions such as coercion, deception and lack of 
capacity may invalidate an ostensible consent, this debate has operated within fairly strict 
parameters. The primary focus has been direct interpersonal coercion, deception or inducement 
at or immediately prior to sexual activity, and individualised medicalised diagnoses that would 
disrupt a person’s capacity to consent. This limited focus finds expression in the conclusive 
                                                          
34 ibid. 
35 Antioch College, ‘The Antioch College Sexual Offense Policy,’ in Leslie Francis (ed), Date Rape: Feminism Philosophy, 
and the Law (The Pennsylvania University Press 1996). 
36 For discussion see Matthew Silliman, ‘The Antioch Policy, a Community Experiment n Communicative Sexuality’, in 
Francis (ibid.). 
37 Melanie Beres, ‘Rethinking the Concept of Consent for Anti-Sexual Violence Activism and Education’ (2014) 24 
Feminism and Psychology 373. 
38 MacKinnon (n 10), 177; Tadros, ‘No Consent’ (n 23); Tadros, ‘Rape Without Consent’ (n 10), 530; Cowan, (n 5).  
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and evidential presumptions regarding consent and in the specific offences against mentally 
disordered adults contained within the Sexual Offences Act 2003.39  
 
At the same time, feminist and other critical scholarship which highlights the extent to 
which supposedly consensual choices are shaped by pervasive social and structural forces is 
often reductively presented as a claim that women’s consent is meaningless under patriarchy.40 
Between these two poles of totalizing patriarchal dominance and almost unfettered free choice, 
lies the reality of sexual agency. Thus the relevant context for evaluating the validity of consent 
extends beyond the immediate surrounding conditions in the moment that a decision is taken. 
It also includes the specific interpersonal dynamic of the parties and the backdrop of the various 
social structures, chiefly gender, against which they operate.41  
 
The need to contextualize sexual consent in this way is particularly significant when 
considering its operation within abusive intimate relationships. In relationships characterized 
by ‘coercive control’, men entrap their female partners through a complex web of techniques 
including violence, isolation, intimidation and control of material resources.42 This constraint 
at the individual level is further supported by structural constraints on women’s autonomy, 
particularly the default consignment of women to the domestic sphere.43 In a relationship of 
this nature, a woman’s liberty is so constrained by her partner that her opportunity to make 
meaningful choices about many aspects of her life, particularly as they relate to her relationship 
with her partner, is reduced almost to nothing. However, a consent-based inquiry which extends 
only as far as the moments immediately preceding sexual activity may obscure more diffuse, 
unspoken threats of violence and deprivation and find that there was ample opportunity for the 
victim to refuse sexual activity or simply leave. Only an inquiry into the broader context of the 
relationship would reveal that there is nothing simple about leaving.44 
 
A high proportion of rape and sexual assault is committed by current or former partners 
of the victim, and yet this subset of offending has proved persistently difficult to bring within 
the ambit of the criminal law. Abusive relationships are thus a particularly salient example of 
the dangers of abstraction which accompany frameworks of sexual offending based on consent. 
They are however only an illustration of a general need to evaluate the legitimacy of sexual 
encounters in their interpersonal, social, structural and temporal contexts.  
 
Summary: Consent is not an appropriate mechanism for distinguishing sex from sexual 
violation 
                                                          
39 Sexual Offences Act 2003 ss 75-76 and 30-44 respectively. 
40 See eg Archard, (n 32); for an overview of the literature see Munro, ‘Constructing Consent’ (n 5). 
41 Gavey, (n 27); Jennifer Nedelsky, Law’s Relations: A Relational Theory of Self, Autonomy and Law (OUP 2012); Palmer, 
Renegotiating Sex and Sexual Violation (n 17). 
42 Evan Stark, Coercive Control: How Men Entrap Women in Personal Life (OUP 2007), especially Ch 7. 
43 ibid, 211; thus, Stark’s theory cannot be straightforwardly mapped onto abusive relationships which do not feature a male 
abuser and female victim, ibid, 391-397. 




Despite its broad appeal, consent is not fit for purpose when it comes to the complex task of 
distinguishing sex from sexual violation. As I have detailed above, consent calls to mind a 
rather mechanical exchange between parties abstracted from their social context and 
interpersonal history. One proposes a sexual act, the other rationally considers it, and either 
accepts or rejects it. If the proposal is accepted, the initiating party performs the act. This image 
is a world away from the ongoing process of reciprocal interaction that is the substance of most 
(if not all) non-violating sexual encounters. As a result, the concept of consent has significant 
limitations as a tool for evaluating the legitimacy of sexual encounters. It is ill-equipped to 
make sense of sexual activity involving parties who are incapable of either giving or 
withholding consent, and it fails to make sense of the many forms sexual coercion can take 
beyond specific immediate threats. 
 
Despite its inadequacies, consent remains preferable to previously dominant ethical 
frameworks that restrictively defined sexual violation as sexual activity imposed via physical 
force, and/or adopted a conservative sexual morality under which non-marital and non-
heterosexual sex are viewed as illegitimate. With this in mind, consent may be best thought of 
as a ‘transition concept… that appears on the scene as an apparently progressive innovation, 
but after a period of experience turns out to be only useful as a transition to a more thoroughly 
revisionary conceptual framework.’45 In what follows, I explore the possibilities for a more 
radical conceptual framework. 
 
Negotiation and communicative sexuality 
Lois Pineau’s path-breaking text ‘Date Rape: A Feminist Analysis’, published in 1989, 
introduced the concept of ‘communicative sexuality’ as a means of refocusing attention from 
snap-shot moments of consent or resistance on the part of a woman to ‘a reading of whether 
she agreed throughout the encounter'.46 Pineau’s central premise is that non-communicative 
sex, ie where the woman does not instruct her partner how and where to touch her and he does 
not ask, will most likely not be enjoyable for her, and it is therefore unreasonable for either the 
man having sex with her or a jury evaluating the scenario after the fact to believe that she 
consents.47 This does not rule out consent in the absence of ongoing communication between 
the parties to a sexual encounter, but sets up a presumption against it, such that the man would 
have to be certain (and able to explain why he was certain) that she was, in fact, consenting 
and had a reason to do so other than reluctant acquiescence to the man’s ‘high pressure’ 
tactics.48 Subsequently, an emerging body of literature, both academic and non-academic, has 
explored similar themes to Pineau, whilst not necessarily building on her ideas explicitly.49 A 
pertinent example is Michelle Anderson’s proposed ‘negotiation model’, under which explicit 
                                                          
45 Veatch (n 5), 5. 
46 Lois Pineau, ‘Date Rape: A Feminist Analysis’ (1989) 8 Law and Philosophy 217, 231; see also Francis (n 35). 
47 In this passage I specifically refer to male perpetrators and female victims in keeping with Pineau’s formulation. 
48 Ibid, 230.  
49 See for example Cowan, (n 5); Thomas Macaulay Millar, ‘Toward a Performance Model of Sex’ in Jaclyn Friedman and 
Jessica Valenti (eds) Yes Means Yes: Visions of Female Sexual Power and a World Without Rape (Seal Press 2008); Rachel 
Kramer Bussel, ‘Beyond Yes or No: Consent as Sexual Process’ in Friedman and Valenti (eds), ibid. 
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verbal communication, or rather its absence, would be central to the definition of rape in 
criminal law.50 
 
A framework for sexual offending based around communication or negotiation holds 
considerable potential for decentering consent and related notions of sexual encounters as 
asymmetric proposals of discrete, well-defined acts, and in its place emphasizing the 
relationality, mutuality and fluidity of sexual encounters. By emphasizing reciprocal dialogue, 
a negotiation standard encourages individuals both to articulate and engage with their own 
desires and to pay attention to those of their partner. Moreover, communicative sexuality more 
closely maps the way that sexual activity is agreed in practice than consent does - it is often 
through ongoing active participation, directing and shaping of the activity that individuals 
express their willingness to engage in a sexual act, as opposed to a one-off moment of 
agreement or refusal.51 Understanding non-violating sexual encounters as produced through a 
process of negotiation and ongoing communication also provides greater scope than a consent 
framework for considering the context in which agreement about a sexual practice was reached, 
though realizing this potential creates some tensions, explored below. 
 
An additional advantage of communicative sexuality is that it places the spotlight on 
the defendant’s, rather than the complainant’s, conduct. In Anderson’s words, ‘Instead of 
asking, “What did she let him do?” the Negotiation Model asks, “Did the person who initiated 
sexual penetration negotiate with his or her partner and thereby come to an agreement that 
sexual penetration should occur?”’52 Pineau similarly advocates asking the defendant whether 
he thought the complainant was enjoying the sexual activity. If not, why was it reasonable for 
him to think she agreed to it? If yes, how did he know? Did he ask her what she liked? Did they 
discuss contraception? What desires did she communicate and how?53 Thus in a rape trial, the 
central question would focus on the behaviour of the accused. A negotiation standard would 
therefore address several of the problems with consent identified above. Nevertheless, attempts 
to operationalize communicative sexuality within the criminal law reveal some weaknesses. 
 
Reformulating sexual offences law around negotiation requires decisions to be made 
about what exactly will satisfy the negotiation condition and which acts need to be negotiated. 
For Anderson, verbal negotiation is essential so that silence cannot be taken as consent to sex. 
Her concern is that existing consent models place the onus on the victim to verbally or 
physically resist their attacker, an unfair requirement given that victims of rape are often 
paralysed by fear.54 In Anderson’s view, affirmative consent requirements cannot solve this 
problem, because consent to other forms of sexual intimacy, eg passionate kissing or petting, 
can be taken as consent to intercourse, so that once a person willingly engages in some sexual 
activity, they acquire the responsibility to clearly communicate any objection to sexual 
penetration. However, conscious of the criticisms of the Antioch Policy which required verbal 
                                                          
50 Michelle Anderson, ‘Negotiating Sex’ (2005) 78 Southern California Law Review 1401. 
51 Pineau (n 46); Cowan, (n 5); Beres (n 37). 
52 Anderson (n 50), 1423.  
53 Pineau, (n 46), 240-241. 
54 Anderson, (n 50), 1405. 
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consent to every level of sexual activity (above), Anderson stresses that her negotiation 
requirement only applies to penetrative sex, and creates an exemption for parties who have 
‘established a context in which they could reliably read one another’s nonverbal behavior to 
indicate free and autonomous agreement.’ 55  Applying these parameters has the effect of 
privileging penetrative sex and long term relationships, despite the prevalence of sexual 
violation within relationships. A more fundamental problem, however, is that the requirement 
of explicit verbal negotiation shifts the focus back to episodic moments of agreement or refusal, 
with all the problems this entails for existing models of consent. 
 
By contrast, Pineau’s proposal emphasises the need for continuing alertness by each 
party to the others’ desires, and calls for evidence of ongoing communication to establish the 
legitimacy of a sexual encounter, as opposed to evidence of a specific moment of agreement. 
Unlike Anderson, Pineau does not specify that communication must be verbal, and this is what 
allows for a more fluid understanding of negotiation. Pineau does not share Anderson’s 
concerns about participation in one act of sexual intimacy being taken as consent for another 
because, as she demonstrates, there is scope for non-verbal forms of communication about sex 
that are reasonably clear, such as guiding another party’s hand to the place one wishes to be 
touched.56 Nevertheless, it is tolerably clear that in some instances individuals will need to use 
explicit words to negotiate their participation in a sexual encounter without misunderstanding, 
but the need for this is idiosyncratic and cannot be straightforwardly mapped on to the nature 
of the sex act or the length of the relationship, as Anderson suggests.  
 
Nevertheless, Pineau’s formulation of communicative sexuality also has some 
problems. Like Anderson, she does not fully exploit the potential of a negotiation framework 
to widen the contextual lens through which consent is evaluated. She does extend the focus of 
the enquiry to cover the duration of the sexual activity, whereas consent models, and even 
Anderson’s negotiation model, are interested primarily in the moments immediately preceding 
a specified sexual act (unless there is clear evidence of the complainant later revoking consent). 
However, Pineau states that any prior behaviour or reputation of the parties should be excluded 
from the inquiry, and that, ‘All that matters is the quality of communication with regard to the 
sex itself’.57 Fixing the parameters as such is in order to exclude irrelevant evidence of the 
complainant’s sexual history from the enquiry. However, in doing so Pineau also excludes 
evidence of previous abuse by the defendant that may be relevant to understanding the quality 
of the complainant’s communication at the relevant moment. 
 
In addition, the essence of Pineau’s proposal is that, ‘Where communicative sex does 
not occur, this establishes a presumption that there was no consent.’58 This reverses the burden 
of proof, such that the defendant is required to prove that the complainant did in fact consent 
despite the likely unsatisfying nature of the sex.59 I share Pineau’s concerns about the tendency 
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for rape victims to be ‘put on trial’ themselves, as detailed above. However, the burden of proof 
exists to protect defendants against the illegitimate infringements of their liberty by the state, 
and should not be abandoned lightly. Moreover, in requiring the defendant to prove that the 
complainant consented (provided the presumption has been triggered), Pineau’s formula 
retains a focus on the complainant’s behavior – did she or did she not consent? Thus the 
presumption approach involves a significant erosion of the presumption of innocence, with 
minimal gain for complainants. Communicative sexuality and negotiation offer a promising 
starting point for rethinking sex and sexual violation, but the weaknesses identified suggested 
further revisions are necessary, as I explore in the following section. 
 
From negotiation to ‘freedom to negotiate’ 
Negotiation and communicative sexuality provide a useful starting point for rethinking sexual 
offences law so as to pay attention to the interactive and processual nature of sexual encounters. 
Nevertheless, these ideas need further development to provide a viable alternative to consent. 
In this final section I consider how the concept of negotiation might be developed in order to 
overcome its weaknesses. This development is informed by data from an original qualitative 
study into understandings of sex and sexual violation.60 
 
Who is responsible for negotiating sexual activity? 
Communicative sexuality is distinctive because, in theory, it treats ongoing reciprocal 
interaction as the paradigm form of legitimate sexual activity, rather than an asymmetric model 
of initiation and acceptance.61 Pineau specifically seeks to challenge discourses of seduction 
and submission which normalize male sexual aggression and female reluctance.62 Similarly, 
Anderson is concerned that ‘girls’ are ‘too often trained to acquiesce to male desire’ rather than 
being treated as ‘human being[s] whose desires and boundaries matter.’63 Both authors contest 
the idea that a dynamic of male initiation and female passivity, whereby a man may carry out 
his sexual desires unless and until his female partner resists, should be acceptable. In order to 
delegitimise this kind of interaction, they propose additional obligations on the initiator to 
verbally ask first and/or to maintain communication throughout the encounter to ensure that 
the other party is consenting. However, models which attach additional requirements to the 
initiation of sexual activity arguably reify an active-passive construction of sexual interaction, 
and are poorly equipped to deal with sexual encounters that do not fit this mould. 
 
This can be illustrated using a sexual experience reported by Rosa, a lay volunteer I 
interviewed for a study of understandings of sex and sexual violation.64 Rosa described an 
experience within an ‘unhealthy’ relationship, which she initially described as ‘not quite rape’: 
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Rosa: There was one particular afternoon, he came back in a foul mood, and I knew he was gonna 
hit me, and I didn't wanna get hit, um, so I just jumped his bones instead. And it wasn't making love, 
it wasn't sex. It was a really hard brutal fuck. I'm sorry for being blunt here, I was just bouncing up 
and down on his lap. And it was, it was almost vicious, I didn't hit him, he didn't hit me, but I, I, I 
knew he had to let that anger out, and I didn't want to get hit. Um, so I just, I hate saying this, rode 
him for all I was worth. Just in a, it was almost like I was the one going, ‘I'm gonna fuck you!’ I 
thought, although physically he was inside me, as far as the emotional power struggle went, and the 
control, I was fucking him. And it stopped him hitting me. Um, and it was one of the most powerful 
and intense experiences I've ever had, I would never like to repeat that ever again. The sex was 
amazing! But the fact that I had to instigate it in that way, to stop him from hitting me, absolutely 
appalling and dreadful. 
Tanya: And, I mean you started off as describing it as ‘not quite rape’ but as ‘having sex 
against your will’ 
Rosa: Yeah, 'cause if I, if I didn't do that, if I didn't - excuse my French - if I didn't fuck him the way 
I did, he'd have ended up hitting me and hurting me.  
Tanya: And in terms of – 
Rosa: And so I just had this really rough sex with him to avoid him hitting me. And as far as I'm 
concerned, yeah it was powerful, it was mental, but it was rape! I didn't wanna have sex with him, 
but more than I didn't wanna have sex with him I didn't want him to fucking hit me again! 
 
Both Anderson and Pineau’s constructions of communicative sexuality have limited utility in 
a situation of this nature. 
 
If this scenario is analysed using Pineau’s model, the central issues are, was it 
reasonable for Rosa’s partner to think she enjoyed the sex? And if not, was it reasonable for 
him to nevertheless think she was consenting? Pineau assumes that it is not reasonable to think 
a woman is enjoying sexual activity in the absence of communication with her partner. 
However, in this scenario, Rosa’s own admission that ‘the sex was amazing!’ (despite also 
being ‘appalling’, ‘dreadful’ and unwanted) and the fact that she ‘jumped his bones’, would 
make it very difficult to argue that it was unreasonable for her partner to think she enjoyed the 
sex. Even if the lack of communication was taken as sufficient evidence for a presumption of 
non-consent, it would also be fairly easy to rebut this presumption given that she initiated the 
sexual activity. By insisting that ‘all that matters is the quality of communication with regard 
to the sex itself’,65 Pineau excludes evidence of the wider history of violence and abuse within 
which that sexual act took place, and its effect on Rosa’s ability to make a free choice. While 
Pineau’s model would struggle to recognize Rosa’s experience of violation, under Anderson’s 
model she would potentially be constructed as the violator. 
 
Anderson’s negotiation model specifically requires a person initiating sexual 
penetration to first verbally negotiate and gain explicit verbal agreement. Assuming that this 
includes a person initiating the sexual penetration of their own body (Anderson is unclear on 
this point), a person in Rosa’s position who initiates penetrative sexual activity without 
negotiating first, would have committed an offence of rape. Arguably, Rosa could be saved by 
Anderson’s exception whereby explicit verbal negotiation is not required if the parties have 
established a context within which they can reliably read each other’s non-verbal signals. It 
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does seem to be the case that Rosa could read her partner’s body language, however what she 
‘read’ in it was not ‘I am agreeing to have sex with you’ but rather ‘I am going to hit you if 
you don’t find some way to diffuse the situation.’ This hardly seems to be what Anderson 
envisaged with this exception. 
 
Both models struggle to make sense of the encounter between Rosa and her partner 
because they assume an initiator-responder model of sexual interaction. The strategy of placing 
additional burdens on the initiator of sexual activity has the undesirable consequence of 
reinforcing the idea that one person takes the lead in sexual encounters and as a result falls back 
into many of the same traps as existing consent models, by constructing sex as an asymmetric 
interaction characterized (at least in Anderson’s case) by neatly delineated acts which can be 
agreed to or refused. In addition, models of communicative sexuality which focus narrowly on 
the form and content of the negotiation between the parties repeat consent’s mistake of 
abstracting sexual encounters from their wider context. The wrongful aspect of the scenario 
described by Rosa is not the lack of communication on the part of either party, but rather the 
surrounding circumstances in which the sexual activity is initiated – something that is obscured 
by a focus on the negotiation between the parties immediately prior to and throughout the 
duration of the sexual activity. The question of whether this particular incident should be 
classed as criminal sexual violation would require a fuller enquiry into the behaviour of Rosa’s 
partner both at the time of the sexual activity and earlier in the relationship, and the extent to 
which this constrained Rosa’s choices at the given time. There is no room to ask these questions 
under a model that only examines negotiation at the time of the sex. 
 
Negotiation and the ‘room to say no’ 
Verbal negotiation is central to Anderson’s distinction between sex and sexual violation 
because her aim is to counteract existing consent models under which silence is treated as 
consent. Anderson rightly draws attention to the problems inherent in expecting a party who is 
unwilling to engage in sexual activity to bear the burden of expressing dissent. However, 
requiring individuals initiating sexual activity to first verbally discuss it with their intended 
partner would not necessarily make it any easier to say ‘no’ rather than ‘yes’ to the proposed 
sexual activity. Both the tone of the negotiation and the context in which it takes place can 
render a verbal proposal oppressive. 
 
The tone in which desires are communicated can have a significant impact on how they 
are received. A verbal request can be spoken in such a way as to make it clear that there is only 
one acceptable answer, while a different tone of voice would transform it into a sincere 
question. Similarly, while physical contact with another person can be forceful, can restrict 
freedom and can prevent resistance, physical touch can also be initiated tentatively, in such a 
way as to invite another party to respond freely. The tone of communication (inviting rather 
than insisting) is therefore more important than the form it takes (verbal rather than physical) 
in terms of preventing situations where one party unwillingly submits to sexual activity through 
lack of choice. The context in which sexual negotiation takes place is similarly important for 




In a focus group with domestic violence support workers, Eve described the way that 
cultural expectations might restrict a person’s options when negotiating sexual encounters: 
 
[I]n the 80s… there was no room to say no really to sex. And I'm pretty certain it's the same now. 
There was no way of justifying saying no. 'Cause there was the pill and then there was the coil, 
condoms, blah blah blah, the whole thing about society, our society, was that we were sexually 
liberated. Which meant actually we had to put out.66 
 
Eve’s reference to the ‘room to say no’ suggests that in the context she describes the problem 
is not so much a lack of verbal communication, but the location of that communication within 
a cultural environment that restricts women’s freedom to express their desires openly. Within 
such a context the initiation of verbal communication regarding a proposed sex act could appear 
less like an attempt at open dialogue and more like a demand. Eve here is focused on broad 
socio-cultural contexts of sexual interaction. These intersect with the narrower context of 
specific interpersonal relationships which can also restrict an individual’s freedom to say ‘no’ 
where sexual communication is set against a backdrop of past abuse. I therefore advocate a 
shift in emphasis for communicative sexuality, placing the focus on the surrounding 
circumstances within which negotiation occurs, rather than on the content of the negotiation 
itself.  
 
It would be unfair to claim that communicative sexuality models take no account of 
context whatsoever. Anderson explicitly states that, ‘Force, coercion, or misrepresentations by 
the actor would be evidence of a failure to negotiate.’67 Anderson’s model could therefore be 
understood as consisting of two requirements: A requirement that the parties reach an explicit 
verbal agreement to engage in the sexual behaviour, and a requirement that both parties are 
free to negotiate the terms of that agreement. Without the freedom to negotiate, explicit verbal 
agreement is meaningless. A person may say ‘yes’ to an offer of sexual penetration, but if the 
other party is holding a gun to their head at the time, the subsequent intercourse will still be an 
instance of sexual violation. What happens if, instead, we take away the requirement of explicit 
verbal agreement? 
 
If two or more parties to a sexual encounter all feel able to openly express their desires 
and their boundaries, but choose not to do so verbally, is it right to say that any of those parties 
has violated the other(s)? I submit that sexual penetration unaccompanied by verbal negotiation 
is not, of itself, an appropriate target for criminalization. Instead, the focus of the criminal law 
should be on sexual activity which is unilaterally imposed on a person who lacks the 
opportunity, the freedom or the ability to refuse to engage in, or to actively participate in 
shaping, the sexual encounter. This would cover situations where a person’s refusal is ignored, 
as well as situations when a person is prevented from expressing refusal in the first place. 
Central to the legitimacy of a given sexual encounter should be the creation and maintenance 
of a space within which negotiation can freely take place.  
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Freedom to negotiate: a possible way forward for law reform? 
Consent is not an effective mechanism with which to distinguish sex from sexual violation. 
Negotiation and communicative sexuality represent a move in the right direction, but they focus 
too heavily on the form and content of negotiation and marginalize the context in which it takes 
place. I propose a standard of ‘freedom to negotiate’ as an alternative framework for sexual 
offences law. The core of the proposal is a restructuring of the existing offences of rape and 
sexual assault under ss1-4 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003. These offences relate to different 
categories of sexual activity, but share a common actus reus element, that the designated sexual 
activity takes place without the victim’s consent. It is submitted that the requirement of non-
consensual sexual activity should be replaced by an actus reus element of sexual activity 
performed on a person who lacks the freedom to negotiate their participation in that activity. 
 
It could be argued that this requirement is already incorporated in the definition of 
consent under section 74 of the 2003 Act, which provides that ‘a person consents if he agrees 
by choice, and has the freedom and capacity to make that choice.’ The law already prohibits 
sexual activity with a person who lacks the freedom to choose. In fact, replacing consent with 
freedom to negotiate involves a radical reframing of the relevant inquiry. The central questions 
for identifying criminal sexual violation are no longer about the actions of the complainant – 
did they consent? Or did they do anything which could give rise to a reasonable belief in their 
consent to sex? These are replaced with questions about the behaviour of the defendant: did 
they do anything to restrict the complainant’s freedom? Did they make the complainant feel 
like their wishes would not be respected? Did they ignore the complainant’s words or body 
language? Changing the central questions in this way has important practical and symbolic 
consequences. 
 
In terms of practical consequences, reframing rape and sexual assault law around a 
concept of freedom to negotiate would benefit both victims and suspects in the investigation 
and trial process. A freedom to negotiate model puts the focus where it should be: on 
interrogating the defendant’s behaviour in context, rather than primarily scrutinizing the 
complainant’s behaviour to ascertain whether it gave rise to a reasonable inference of consent. 
In addition, it provides greater scope for victims to articulate on their own terms the ways in 
which their freedom to negotiate sex was constrained within the context of the particular 
relationship and the particular encounter in question, rather than requiring them to categorise 
their experience as strictly consensual or non-consensual, a framework which may not easily 
map onto their experiences. Under freedom to negotiate the prosecution would be required to 
produce evidence demonstrating that the victim’s freedom to negotiate their role in the sexual 
activity was constrained, and showing how the defendant either contributed to or took 
advantage of this constraint. This would mitigate the tendency to ‘put the victim on trial’ as the 
prosecution would not need to prove an absence of consent, which in practice often requires 
evidence of sufficient resistance by the victim.68 At the same time however, the presumption 
of innocence would be preserved as there would be no implicit or explicit reversal of the burden 
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of proof requiring the defendant to prove that they did communicate sufficiently with the 
victim, as Pineau advocates.69 
 
Symbolically, introduction of a freedom to negotiate model would mark a significant 
shift in the way sex and sexual violation are conceptualized. The proposed formulation frames 
sexual encounters as dynamic processes of interaction rather than discrete, easily divisible 
events. It emphasizes the relational, affective and embodied dimensions of sexuality and 
provides greater scope to take account of context and the power relations between the parties 
when evaluating a given sexual encounter. As such it more closely maps the messy reality of 
sexual encounters than an abstract consent standard. The linguistic break with consent and the 
unfamiliarity of the new terminology would also provide an opportunity for public discussion 
and consideration of the parameters of ethical and legal sexual activity. By contrast efforts to 
reframe consent or re-educate people about its meaning are obstructed by the considerable 
conceptual baggage which that term carries and the proliferation of existing meanings with 
which it is associated. 
 
The model which I have outlined here is presented as a starting point for rethinking the 
distinction between sex and sexual violation in criminal law. There are of course numerous 
details which remain to be developed and which there is not scope to explore here. Some of 
these questions are familiar. Like consent, consideration must be given to the kinds of force, 
coercion or deception that would restrict a person’s freedom to negotiate, and the extent to 
which this freedom must be restricted in order to attract criminal liability. In this area, a 
freedom to negotiate model would in principle broaden the lens through which coercion can be 
considered, to look beyond direct and explicit threats immediately prior to the sexual activity. 
The vexatious issue of the mens rea of rape would remain, but the terrain of the debate would 
be relocated. Instead of oscillating between reasonable and honest belief in consent, discussion 
would now focus on whether a defendant must have intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or 
negligently restricted the victim’s freedom to negotiate, or exploited existing restrictions on 
the victim’s freedom. A subjective mens rea standard might be more palatable where it relates 
to a defendant’s awareness of constraint and coercion as opposed to belief in consent. More 
radically, a freedom to negotiate model would also provide a basis for rethinking the 
relationship between rape and sexual assault and many of the other offences contained within 
the Sexual Offences Act 2003. This model foregrounds power disparities between the parties 
which prevent one individual from negotiating their participation in sexual activity. As such, it 
calls into question whether separate offences against children70 or against mentally disordered 
adults71 address a different form of sexual violation from rape and sexual assault, and whether 
there is a clear rationale for these additional offences. 
 
Conclusions 
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Despite its broad appeal, consent is not an appropriate or effective way to distinguish legitimate 
sexual activity from sexual violation. Consent models invoke the abstract, disembodied, 
rational subject of liberal discourse and emphasise the policing of bodily boundaries as opposed 
to the relationality and intersubjectivity of sexual encounters. Consent is therefore useful for 
conceptualizing asymmetric proposals and agreements to discrete acts, but poorly suited to 
evaluating dynamic interactions between parties, absent clear fixed parameters, which 
constitute the bulk of real world sexual encounters. Consent models also have limited capacity 
for taking account of the contexts within which sexual activity is negotiated. Reframing the 
distinction between sex and sexual violation around a concept of negotiation or communication 
addresses many of these problems in theory, by constructing sexual encounters as ongoing 
processes of reciprocal interaction rather than episodic moments of consent or refusal. 
However, adopting a narrow focus on communication immediately prior to and during sexual 
activity reproduces several of consent’s flaws. A concept of freedom to negotiate, which is 
informed by negotiation models as well as by original empirical research, is proposed as the 
basis for a radical rethinking of sexual offences law. At its core, freedom to negotiate 
emphasizes the context in which sexual activity takes place, requiring that, at a minimum, all 
parties to sexual activity should have the space to negotiate both the fact and nature of their 
participation throughout the duration of that activity. 
